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Introduction 
Peggy DesAutels and Joanne Waugh 
We offer this volume as a contribution to the ongoing conversa tion that goes 
under the name of "feminist ethics." This conversation took an exciting and 
interesting turn recently at the Feminist Ethics Revisited Conference; many of 
the essays in this volume articulate ideas and analyses first presented there. 1 
The term feminist ethics was used broadl y at this conference- as it is again 
here-to refer to the perspectives on women 's experience that come into 
view at the intersections of ethics, politics, philosophy, and li terature . Earlier 
generations of philosophers-both male and female-have fo und that the 
experiences of women fit neither eas ily nor neatly into the ca tegories fa-
vored by trad itional, mainstream philosophy. That the dominant discourse of 
philosophy still strains to accommodate women's experiences has prompted 
feminist ph ilosophers to go beyond the usual boundaries, especiall y in 
ethics. In her contribution to this volume, "Seeing Power in Morality: A Pro-
posal for Feminist Naturalism in Ethics," Margaret Urban Walker succinctly 
summarizes feminists' achievements in e thics. "Feminist ethiCS, " Walker 
writes, "is inevitably, and fundamentally, a discourse about morality and 
power" (4). Our volume emphasizes this essential insight of feminist ethics. 
Philosophical e thics typically neglects power, taking its subject to be the 
ideal or transcendent nature of morality-something finer and higher than 
mere power. When attention is paid to questions of power, it is typica lly seen 
as standing in opposition to morality. Walker decries this neglect and denies 
this opposition at the same time that she insists that the concept of morality 
should be neither reduced to power no r eliminated in its favor. Walker insists 
on the importance of morality for challenging the legitimacy of dist.ributions 
of power, for those who are powerless have ne ither grounds nor mea ns for 
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challenging existing power relations without appealing to morali ty. Indeed , 
this is one reason why feminist moral discourse asks whether and how 
power is distributed equally and unequally, whether and how it ga ins legiti-
macy or sustains itself illegitimately, and whether and when people having 
power over others is, in Walker's words, "morally necessary, arbitralY, or cat-
astrophic" (5), To answer such questions Walker suggests that we recognize 
that morality "is a disposition o/pOWe1'S tbmugb an arrangement oJ resp on-
sibilities," that these responsibilities and powers are both social and distinc-
tively moral, and that they are no less "natural" for being either or both (6) . 
Indeed, such powers and responsibilities are "natural" because they are nec-
essalY in order for human societies to function, and human life naturally per-
petuates itself through human societies. 
Moral concepts can be abstracted from social practices only at the risk of 
missing the part of their meaning-typically the largest part- that is embed-
ded in the social practices that generate the concepts. This is not to deny the 
moral authority of morality; rather, it is to insist that there is a specifically 
moral understanding of social practices, an understanding that we might, fol-
lowing Walker, call the moral structure of these practices. Walker sees this 
moral structure in practices of responsibility; and with the understanding of 
responsibility comes the understanding of agency and the values, positive 
and negative, that attach to those agents to w hom we differentially ascribe 
responsibility. It is our understanding of these practices and the concepts 
embedded in them that grounds the trust that is recognized in the velY no-
tion of the moral authority of morality . Of course, these practices may be sus-
tained by power and authority that is not moral, a fact that is often more 
transparent to those who have a lesser share of power and responsibility and 
are accordingly valued-or devalued- by those with a greater share . 
Walker provides an example of how a concept like the social contract-as 
a contract between equals-when analyzed in terms of the social practices 
that make sense of it, defines itself in terms of the powers that white male 
equals have ove1' those who are neither male nor white and thus are not 
equals.2 As Walker puts it, "Equals do not just have different and grea ter 
powers and entitlements relative to those below: they are defined as equal 
by their shared entitlements to and powers over those below" (1 2) . Indeed, / 
the logic of equality that allegedly structures the Enlightenment project of 
moral universalism may also be what renders the project impossible . There 
is still another problem with this project of building an ethics and polities on 
consensual equality, for as feminist philosophers have insisted , within the 
scope of Our moral concern we find those who are not equal because of their 
immaturity, disability, incapacity, vulnerability, and dependence. Such in-
equality, as Walker notes, describes or will describe all of us at some point 
in our lives-whatever our rational agency at this time. Questions about our 
responsibilities to those with whom we have unequal power relationships 
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thus move us to undertake political analyses that invoke concepts other than 
a social contract between and among equals, ana lyses in which questions 
must be asked about the exercise of power, the same questions that those 
working in feminist ethics ask. 
These politica l analyses also provide us with occasions on which to de-
velop the solidarity necessary for feminist politiCS and ethi CS, as Uma 
Narayan suggests in "The Scope of Our Concerns: Reflections on 'Woman' as 
the Subject of Feminist Politics." Such occasions for deve loping solidarity are 
crucial in Na rayan's analys is because she finds the suggestion that feminist 
politiCS groups together all experiences of those who identify themselves as 
women to be a nonstarte r. Indeed, Narayan takes this to be the question that 
curre ntly faces feminist ethics: "Can the scope of feminist analyses, and the 
agenda of feminist moral and political engagement, be justifi ably restricted 
to 'issues pertaining to the interests of women'I" (15). That feminist politiCS 
should take its project as fighting for the interests of all women had been the 
conclusion of radical feminists , w ho took "women" as the name of a group 
whose members had been systematically oppresse 1 because they were 
women. But the analyses presented by radical feminists were themselves 
contested by poor women, women of color, and women of differing sexual 
orientation(s) as not taking their experiences into account. One response to 
these objections, which Narayan labels the "Differences Critique," is to in-
clude the interests of these neglected groups, expanding the view of 
women's interests to form what Narayan calls the "Jigsaw Puzzle Picture 
Model of Women's Interests." But if all of women's interests do not fit to-
gether as this model suggests, then fe minist politicS (and feminist ethics) may 
not enta il advanCing the interests of all women. What should drive feminist 
politics and feminist ethiCS, Narayan suggests, is solidarity based on shared 
p olitical analyses and not necessa ril y the experience of being oppressed by 
patriarchy. Solidarity based on shared po litics can lead to privileged 
women-and men-working against their own privileged intere ts and with 
and for women whose oppression results from some combination of gender, 
race, class, and sexual orientation. Gender is not merely added to these other 
facto rs; the relevant metaphor for this combination is chemical, not mechan-
ical. Because one cannot cut off the effects of gen l.e r from those of race, 
class, and sexuality, Narayan suggests that the "Oppressed Identity-Based 
Cutoff Model" of political membership may deprive feminists of theoretical 
insights and practica l stra tegies fo r dea ling with oppression. 
Questions about how analyses of inequality and oppr ssion affect con-
ceptions of agency have received a good deal of attention from feminist 
philosophers, and there has been some concern that the very notion of 
agency as it has been formulated in traditional ethics is fata lly compromised 
insofar as it assumes, first , that moral agents are equal in power(s) and , sec-
ond, that autonomy should be identified with those who are depended on 
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rather than dependent. Not only is this notion of the equality of moral agents 
defined, as Walker obselves, in terms of their sharing entitlements to and 
powers over unequals, the concepts of dependence and independence in-
voked in such a notion themselves depend on d istinguishing-artificially-
between the public and the private spheres and on identifying morality with 
public behavior. Feminist ethics is left with a host of problems to add ress, not 
the least of them being whether and how moral damage is done to op-
pressed people by diminishing their conception of themselves as moral 
agents. Especially pressing are questions of how the concept of moral 
agency may be admitted into feminist ethics: What formulation(s) and what 
metaphors are and should be Ll sed to introduce the concept? And how w ill 
certain formulations and metaphors affect the moral structure(s) of the social 
practices of which they are a part? 
Diana Tietjens Meyers takes up the question of how social categories of 
gender affect women 's conceptions of themselves in "Social Groups and In-
dividual Identities-Individuality, Agency, and TheOly." Meyers argues for a 
conception of identity that recognizes the power that social constructs of 
gender exercise in individual identity, despite individual cho ice. The conflict 
that may ensue between a socially mandated conception of identity, in 
w hich one is a member of a subordinated group, and a sense of a self that 
belies this social identification may result in a sense of alienation, but it is a 
sense of alienation that Meyers regards as desirable insofar as it provokes 
moral reflection and emancipatory social criticism. Reflection on the ways in 
which gender identities do and do not affect an individual's sense of per-
sonal identity makes an individual self-conscious in a way that enables so-
cial critique . That some feminists have rejected theories of gender because 
they seem incompatible with individualized identities results, Meyers sug-
gests, from a tendency to see gender theories as essentialist, tbat is, as con-
forming to a social-scientific epistemic model based on inductive general-
izations about women. As universal generalizations about women, gender 
theories are easily disconfirmed by empirica l data, despite the fact that ele-
ments of these theories resonate with the experiences of many women. In-
spired by Marilyn Frye 's suggestion that we regard gender theories as 
metaphors that provide insight and understanding without asse rting identity 
or equivalence between things,3 Meyers suggests that we can do justice to 
gender theories that, in turn, do justice to some women's experience by 
viewing them as we do literary texts. Just as interpretations of li teralY texts 
seek support in passages from the texts and address seeming inconsistencies 
between the interpretation and other parts of the text, theories of how social 
constructions of gender affect individual identity provide different perspec-
tives on the ways in which gender-as well as class, race, and sexuality-is 
constitutive of an identity that is nonetheless p ersonal and individua l. In 
reading gender theories of identity describing other socially subordinated 
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grou ps as we would literary texts, we must pay attention to the rhetorical 
va lue of the universalist tone of these theories, fo r this tone functions in a 
way similar to hyperbole and shouting: it quells disagreement and dissent. 
The goal, then, must be to generate theories of gender-and social practices 
that employ them- that allow members of subordinated groups to find their 
voices. 
In "Identity and Free Agency," Hilde Lindemann Nelson looks at the 
power that some texts-ones she refers to as master narratives-have in 
structuring the identities of members of oppressed groups and how they may 
find their voices through counterstories. Drawing on narratives from nurses, 
Nelson illustrates how "a powerful group's misperception of an oppressed 
group results in d isrespectful treatment that, as in the case of the nurses, can 
impede group members in cany ing out their responsibilities" (50). These 
master narratives are morally oppressive to members of subordinated 
groups insofar as their capacity for normative competence is denied or di-
minished by the narratives. Nonnative competence entails not only that one 
is able to understand moral norms and act accordingly but also that one is 
capable of normative seif-disclosure--that one may "reveal who one is, 
morally speaking, through what one does" (55). 
Revealing oneself as a moral agent is a complex affair. One must see one-
self as a moral agent, as morally trustworthy. But, if one sees oneself as a 
moral agen t, this requires, in turn , that othel''S see her as a moral agent and 
understand her action not only as a moral action but also as a moral action 
of a specific kind. Thus is a person's identity a function of how others un-
derstand w hat she does, as well as how she understands what she does, and 
thus is free agency a function not only of an agent's capacities and abilities 
but also of how others view her capacities and abilities. How others see her 
contributes to her understanding of herself-of what she can and should do. 
This gives others power to harm a person by depriving her of the identity of 
a morally competent agent-what Nelson calls "the harm of deprivation of 
opportunity"-and, in so dOing, by contributing to her own sense of herself 
as having limited or diminished moral agency-what Nelson ca lls "the harm 
of infiltrated consciousness." In some cases, such as that involving the nar-
ratives of the nurses cited by Nelson, this harm can be repaired by means of 
a counterstolY that aims at changing not only the perception that the pow-
erful have of the oppressed group but also an oppressed person's percep-
tion of herself. 
But such harm is a function not just of the means used but also of the ex-
tent to which the identities of the oppressed have been structured by these 
maste r narratives. Depending, as Nelson says, on not just how but also when 
a counterstory is introduced, it mayor may not be possible to repair the harm 
of infiltrated consciousness or, at least, to right the wrong done to those 
whose sense of self has been undermined by oppression. Nelson cites as an 
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example of someone with an identity beyond narrative repair a person who 
has never formed any notion of her free agency beca use of oppressive social 
structures combined with personal domination in an intimate relationship . 
Bat-Ami Bar On takes how others view her and how she views herself as 
her starting point in "Violent Bodies." Bar On recounts how she developed 
her violent body first in response to the taunts of other children, then in ac-
cordance with the customs and expectations of a Jewish- Israeli youth in 
postindependence Israel, then as an adult Israeli citizen in military service, 
and finally as a feminist involved in a women's antirape movement in the 
United States. Feminist suspicions and criticisms of violent bodies are 
grounded in the fact that it is the male vio lent body that is so often the means 
through which women experience vio lence, prima rily in the fo rm of rape 
and battery in their everyday lives and during wartime . But what, Bar On 
asks, are the ethical implications of her "violent body"-a body that is ready 
to fight and habituated to respond to violence with violence with little or no 
conscious reflection about this response? To frame her analysis Bar On turns 
to Hannah Arendt, whose work on violence is perhaps the most sustained 
thinking about violence undertaken by a female philosopher-or a male 
philosopher, for that matter. 4 For Arendt, violent action can only be justified 
on ethico-political grounds, and because, as Bar On points out, we are lim-
ited in our ability to predict and control whether any action, including a vio-
lent one, will achieve the end for which it is the means, violent actions must 
be limited in scope and can be justified only for the short term. (Violence in 
self-defense is unproblematic because the danger is clear and present and 
the end justifying the means is immediate.) Political ends can thus justify in-
strumental violence and instruments like violent bodies, as long as violence 
is being used to halt-and not to promote-the decline qf political p ower. Vi-
olence must always be backed by and restrained by political power, that is, 
the conscious and concerted action of a group of people working together 
not out of self-interest but out of solidarity- out of care and concern for one 
another and the world. 
This Arendtean sense of political differs from standard feminist usage in 
which violence against women is political because it is made possible by a 
systemic matrix of domination and submission. For Arendt, systemic domi-
nation does not deserve the appellation political because people working to-
gether in concert and solidarity are central to her meaning of the term. Bar 
On observes that, pace Arendt, who objected to feminism insofar as it was 
motivated only by women's self- interest and not by care for the world, 
women's self-defense can be seen as a political project in an Arendtean un-
derstanding of the term, as can the production of violent female bodies. Be-
cause women's project of producing vio lent bodies serves as an "interrup-
tion of the status quo . . . what otherwise would have proceeded 
automatically" (71), Bar On argues that the production of women's vio lent 
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bodies is transgressive. As transgress ive, Bar On considers it justified ethico-
politically-as long as women do not transgress boundaries "inhumanely" 
and "destructively" and rema in aware of, and wary about, the seductive na-
ture of violence (71). 
That feminist ethics develops a theoretical framework and political strate-
gies to contest the exercise of oppressive power is also of concern to Lisa 
Tessman , Margaret A. McLaren, Barbara S. Andrew, and Nancy Potter, each 
of whom analyzes how virtues of character and their realization in habitu-
ated actions contribute to these projects. Using a cri tical virtue ethics frame-
work, Lisa Tessman argues that what is morally objectionable about oppres-
sion is that it interferes with human flourishing and that it does so for 
targeted social groups in a systematic way. OppreSSion does this by pre-
venting or restricting access to "external goods" but also by preventing or 
hindering one in the development and exercise of the virtues and, in so do-
ing, precluding one from acquiring a character that is part of a good life . Of 
particular concern to Tessman is that we examine how moral damage hin-
ders members of op pressed groups from effectively resisting their oppres-
sion at the same time as we avoid dehumanizing the morally damaged group 
by treating that group as "a problem. " 
Analyzing how oppressive forces can interfere with human flourishing re-
quires not only that we augment Aristotle'S list of the factors interfering with 
fl ourishing by noting the systematic nature of this interference. We must also 
add goods that Aristotle did not recognize, including goods that are not cap-
tured under distributive paradigms. Of primaJy importance to Aristotle, of 
course, is the acquisition of those virtues the exercise of which results in a 
good life. Tessman adds the accompa nying realization that if "there is injus-
tice already at work in the formation of character, the fact that something is 
based on character does not imply that it is not also rooted in an oppressive 
social system" (82). The task-as Tessman, echOing Claudia Card, reminds 
uss- is that of distinguishing the insights of the oppressed from the moral 
damage that results from oppressio n. Such damage would include the failure 
to develop self-esteem, the fear of being conspicuous, and the tendencies to 
dissemble and to ingratiate oneself or identify with one's oppressors. Such 
character traits typically develop as sUlv iva l mechanisms when one lives un-
der conditions of oppression, but this does not mean that they are not morally 
damaging as well. Indeed, some psychological traits are doubly damaging 
from a moral perspective insofar as they help to convince the members of the 
oppressed groups that their circumstances are the result not of systemic struc-
tures and forces but of their own flawed characters and psyches. 
To acknowledge that some of us have the bad "moral luck" to be mem-
bers of oppressed groups does not, however, re lieve us of all moral re-
sponsibility for our characters, even if their formation does not lie com-
plete ly w ithin our control. There is, of course, considerable risk of harm 
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to members of oppressed groups in speaking of moral damage . Tessman 
illustrates this risk in recounting how the concept of the "damaged black 
psyche" became the justification for opposing changes in oppressive so-
cial structures and forces. This argument proceeds from the assumption 
that once the psychic damage has been done, the repai r needed should 
come from neither economic ass istance nor political empowerment but, 
rather, from the inculcation of "character-building" values, usually con-
ceived of as "family values" where the heads of household are male. In-
deed, an extreme version of this argument reverses the causal sequence, 
arguing that character deficiencies are the cause and not the consequence 
of such economic states as welfare dependency, despite the fact that his-
torically economic opportunities for blacks have been so severely re-
stricted, e ither in the number of opportunities or in the amount of com-
pensation, as to be at times virtually nonexistent. Acknowledging that talk 
of moral damage is risky, Tessman points out that one does not have to 
choose between working to change structu ral causes of oppression and 
attempting to repair moral damage. Even more importantly , she suggests 
that changes in systemic structures and forces while necessary to undo the 
oppression of social groups may not be sufficient to repair the moral dam-
age that is part of their oppression. Tessman thus proposes that radica l 
strategies of resistance to oppression include a critical virtue ethics, for, 
among other things, the moral damage done to members of oppressed 
groups may interfere w ith their abilities to form such strategies of resist-
ance . Equally important, those who have been morally damaged because 
of oppression have "responsibilities of their own," Card has observed, "to 
their peers and descendants."6 
In "Feminist Ethics: Care as a Virtue," Margaret McLaren provides an ex-
ample of how a traditionally female trait such as caring can be a resource for 
a feminist ethics that bases its approach in critical virtue theory. The concept 
of care is problematic for feminist ethics because some theorists have argued 
that defining care as characteristic of women and other subordinated groupS 
is instrumental in their oppression. Such definitions can serve to "naturalize" 
and perpetuate oppression and can be morally damaging to the extent that 
women sacrifice their own interests for the interests of others, including 
those of their oppressors. In so doing, women fail to develop their own iden-
tity , autonomy, resources, and moral agency. However, other theorists have 
considered care to be a female trait that provides a foundation for a feminist 
ethics. McLaren argues that care ethics of the sort inspired by tlle work of 
Carol Gilligan is a f em.inine but not a fem.inist ethics because, among other 
things, it reinscribes the stereotypes of women that have structured and per-
petuated the oppression of women. Still, McLaren insists that the concepts 
developed by feminist philosophers in response to care ethics provide us 
with the resources we need for a feminist virtue ethics. 
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That care has been seen as a virtue of women rather than of men is prima 
facie problematic, for seeing virtues as gender related has been one way in 
which ethical theolY has contributed to and perpetuated oppression. Be-
cause virtue ethics is not innocent in the matter of women 's oppression does 
not mean, however, that it has nothing to offer to feminist ethics. McLaren, 
like Tessman, believes that a critical virtue theory has much to recommend 
it as a normative ethical theOlY, for, unlike deontological theories, virtue 
ethics assumes that the moral agent is an embodied member of a community 
and, in so dOing, addresses what is concrete and particular in moral situa-
tions. This becomes especially clear once we consider the attention that 
virtue theolY pays to the contributions of character, practical judgment, emo-
tions, and moral perception in deliberating about actions and motives. 
Virtue ethics holds that human flourishing-and how one's community 
contributes or does not contribute to such flourishing-is both a condition 
for and a conseq uence of a moral life. Following Joan Tronto, McLaren ar-
gues that the concept of care should be extended into the political realm 
with the consequence that the boundary between morality and politics-or 
the public and the private-is erased 7 When this boundalY goes, so should 
the notion that women's virtues are those of the domestic sphere in contrast 
to those virtues (which, if not feminine, are presumably masculine) that al-
low the formulation of abstract, "universal," moral principles-principles 
that appear to be universal only in the public, and not the private, sphere. Fi-
nally, conceiving of care as a public or political virtue incorporates a concern 
for justice-the concern that care ethics allegedly slights. A feminist ethics 
that conceives of care as a political virtue will be a virtue ethics informed by 
feminist politics but not one in which care is the only virtue. McLaren sug-
gests that other virtues in a feminist virtue theory would include such things 
as feistiness and playfulness, in addition to more readily recognized virtues 
of self-respect, openness, courage, and self-awareness. 
The importance of contesting the image of the ethical woman as caring 
to the extent of being the "Angel in the House" prompts Barbara Andrew 
to look for another image of the ethical woman in "Angels, Rubbish Col-
lectors, and Pursuers of Erotic Joy: The Image of the Ethical Woman. "8 Like 
McLaren, Andrew insists that the virtue of care should not be unde rstood 
as exemplified primarily or solely by the domestic nurturer and proposes 
instead that we take seriously Michel Foucault's claim that ethics has its 
origins in "the care of the self. "9 As Foucault understands it, such care aims 
at a telos-"the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a 
moral way"-and thus does Andrew seek the telos of feminist ethics-the 
ideal image of the moral agent that inspires the ethical se lf to action. An-
drew holds , as do Tessman and McLaren , that feminist moral action is po-
litical action and that care properly understood neglects neither the moral 
autonomy necessary for political action nor justice as both a means and an 
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end of political action. Indeed , it is Andrew's cla im that the ideal of e thi-
cal relationship that care ethics has helped to formulate necessarily in-
volves autonomy and that the recognition of this ideal p rovides care ethics 
with an alternative telos to that of the Angel in the House . According to 
Andrew, the notion of e thical relationship ful fills the same function in care 
ethics that the notion of autonomy does in ethical theories centering on 
justice: each acts as a condition for moral actions and judgments, but each 
depends, in turn , on the existe nce of social conditions that provide the ba-
sic goods that enable its exercise . Thus, feminist e thics needs a te los that 
incorporates both care and autonomy. 
The ideal image(s) of the ethical woman must recognize the importance of 
our desires both for connection with others and for autonomy; this is not ac-
complished by bifurcating between the (good) image of the Angel in the 
House and the (bad) image of the "Woman of the Streets ." Following a sug-
gestion of Drucilla Cornell 's,1O Andrew considers the chiffionn ier-the junk 
or rubbish collector- as an image of the e thical woman. As a chiffionnier, 
the ethical woman sifts through the remnants of philosophical theories and 
systems for usefu l strategies for feminist political and ethical action . As such , 
she gives up the dream of the perfect philosophical system or theory, the one 
that will guarantee her neither loss nor oppression, and accepts that she must 
improvise strategies that allow her to both engage the other and care for the 
self. Sti ll , even this image of the ethical woman lacks an ingredient that An-
drew thinks is essential to the image of the ethical woman: the recognition 
of the imaginary, the domain in which, as Cornell notes, we as embodied, 
sexual creatures imagine ourselves as free and autonomous as we fulfill our 
desires for ourselves and for others.'! Cornell observes that the imaginary 
domain as such can only be accommodated within an abstract ideal of sub-
jectivity: "Defining the person only through a normative outline ... [is) the 
only way we can preserv e freedom of the personality. "12 In this way we em-
ploy the concept of the abstract person in our political analyses as one w ho 
determines for herself her values, including how best to love, even though 
these values have their source beyond her. In an attempt to do justice to the 
imaginary , Andrew turns to Simone de Beauvoir's image of woman as pur-
suing erotic joy as she creates "found art" and negotiates her sexual and car-
ing relationships with others in order to experience the joys of connection 
and of freedom.13 For Beauvoir, the erotic relationship provides the para-
digm of our existence as subjects who care for ourselves and connect with 
others while also existing as Others for subjects who, too, desire both free-
dom and connection with us. Andrew concludes that whatever ethical im-
ages we propose must acknowledge that we partiCipate with each other in 
relationships of power. 
Nancy Potter also raises a question about our responsibilities to others in 
her chapter "Is Refusing to Forgive a Vice?" Potter agrees with Tessman , 
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McLaren, and Andrew that our moral evaluations should take the form not of 
testing whether our actions are instances of a universal moral principle but 
of asking whether an action and the disposition to which it attests are defi-
cient or excessive- vi1'tuaus or viciaus--in the context in which they occur. 
Potter notes that when moral theorists are asked about forg iveness they are 
prone to take the concept out of a religious context but are nonetheless will-
ing to assert its central p lace in our moral lives. Indeed, forgiveness is com-
monly viewed as moral beca use it indicates that one who has been wronged 
has overcome (justifiably) negative feelings toward the person or persons re-
sponsible for the harm or injury. These negative feelings include such feel-
ings as resentment, and the presumption is that giving in to such negative 
feelings indicates some moral lapse or weakness on the part of the one who 
has failed to overcome them. An injured party who forgives believes that the 
harm or injury perpetuated by the wrongdoer was morally wrong and that 
the wrongdoer is responsible for the action. Nonetheless, the injured party 
overcomes negative feelings toward the wrongdoer. In such a view, the act 
of forgiveness suggests that the wrongdoer in some sense transcends the 
harmful acts committed in the past. Accordingly, some moral theorists speak 
of the empathy w ith the wrongdoer that allows forgiveness and of the state 
of resto ration or reconciliation that is its aim. 
But Potter contends that this view of forgiveness fail s to take into ac-
count that when forgiveness is viewed as a virtue there are situations in 
which its exercise can be seen as an excess or a deficiency. She notes that 
Je ffri e Murphy, for example, observes that we cannot be obligated to for-
give another-or seek restoration or reconciliation at any cost- if doing 
so indica tes that we lack self-respect, that we do not count ourse lves as 
equal in moral importance to others .1 4 In Murphy's view, fo rgiveness must 
be compatible with respect for bo th oneself and others as members of a 
moral community. Using this criterion, there will be cases in which both 
the action of forgiving another and the disposition to forgive will count as 
vices . Potter finds a case in which forgiveness would be a vice in Dorothy 
Allison's novel, Bastard Out of Carolina 1 5 Bone, the protagonist in the 
nove l, suffers repea ted beatings a t the hands of her stepfather- bea tings 
about which he r mother knows and which she sometimes tries to help her 
daughter escape . However, Bone's mother is unable to choose her daugh-
ter's well -being over what she perceives as her own-remaining with her 
husband. The husband's ultimatum that his wife choose him over her 
daughter takes the form of raping Bone, a rape that Bone's mothe r wit-
nesses . Although Bone's mother and stepfather-and the larger commu-
nity of which they are a part-are victims of the oppression suffered by 
poor whites in America's rural SOLlth , an oppression that Bone recognizes 
she shares with the members of her family, Bone refuses to fo rgive them 
fo r her injuries . As Potter notes, Bo ne has no reason to either forgive o r 
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seek a reconciliation w ith her stepfather, who scarcely acknowledges his 
wrongdoing or repents fo r it. There is no positive re lationship that Bone 
can restore w ith him, no point to any reconciliation . Her resentment of he r 
mother and her fa ilure to fo rgive her, while clearly pa inful to Bone be-
cause she has given up the opportunity to recover her mothe r's love , may 
be necessary if Bone is to rea li ze that she has suffe red an inju ry that she 
did not deserve . Thus may Bone 's re fusal to fo rgive be seen, Potter sug-
gests, as the mean between excess and deficie ncy, fo r it signals her re-
spect for herself-a nd others-as membe rs of a moral community, as 
moral agents who have a right to expect that injustice be punished. To re-
fuse to allow a wrong to go unpunished , to refuse to fo rgive when to do 
so would be to diminish one's moral worth-and the reby commit a furthe r 
injury and injustice to oneself- can hard ly be counted as a vice . 
In "Gender and Moral Reason ing Revisited: Reengaging Feminist Psychol-
ogy," Phyllis Rooney argues, too, that feminists should redirect their atten-
tion to the situational character of both gender and moral psychology, 
specifically with the aim of enhancing our understanding of moral reasoning. 
Rooney shares the concern expressed by many of the contributors to this 
volume that, in talk of care and justice as different voices in moral delibera-
tions, we fail to notice that some of these voices are the voices of the op-
pressed. Empirical studies conducted subsequent to those described in Gilli-
gan's In a D~fferent Voice contest the claim that males are more likely than 
females to have a disposition for moral rationalism,16 that is, an enthusiasm 
for systematizing abstract rules and general principles and for seeing the pri-
maty values of moral agency as consisting in autonomy, consistency, and 
control. But the issue-as Rooney insists-is not merely a factual one, for tra-
ditional accounts of moral reasoning have asserted men's superiori ty as a 
sex over women precisely insofar as men have this proclivity toward moral 
rationalism and women do not. Indeed, the justification that one so often 
finds for denying women moral rationality is women's presumed inferiority 
at reasoning in this f ashion. Thus does Rooney express the same concern as 
other contributors that "in the feminist literature there has been an insuf fi-
cient reading against the grain of this traditional supposition" (1 56). She is 
especially concerned that the "care voice" attributed to women is character-
ized as eschewing abstract principles in favo r of attending to the concrete as-
pects and contextual features of a moral situation. Rooney notes the impre-
cision with w hich abstract is used in such a characterization of the care ethic 
and points out that "abstracting from a (multifaceted) moral situation with re-
spect to particular kinds of relationships and responsibilities among ind ivid-
uals in it, and not with respect to the specific juridical rights of those indi-
viduals as autonomous agents, is one way of abstracting from the situation; 
another way involves abstracting with respect to the latter and not the fo r-
mer (and these, clearly, need not be the only way of abstracting)" (156- 57). 
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Rooney cites the psychological research of the past two decades that con-
tests the view of earlier resea rch, like Gilligan's, according to which gender 
consists of more or less stable intrapsychic traits and dispositions. More re-
cent research suggests that gender is also very much a social categoty, one 
that social regulation works to produce, perpetuate, and reinforce through 
gender norms, practices, and expectations that can be related to power dif-
ferentials. Empirical studies suggest that modifications of the experimental 
situation can result in the appearance-or disappearance-of gender differ-
ences and that the poli tica l dimension of different research programs may do 
so as well . Prompted by the possibility that Gilligan's work "exaggerates d if-
ferences in disposition between women and men and overlooks differences 
in social structure, such as power differentia ls that press for different behav-
ior in the two sexes," Nancy Clopton and Gwendolyn Sorell have studied the 
extent to which gender is stable versus situational in instances of moral rea-
soning.t7 Their conclusion is that gender differences in the orientation of 
moral reasoning resu lt more from "differences in current life situation than 
from stable gender characteristics."18 Rooney concludes that their study sug-
gests that if care and justice apply to something, it is "to different kinds of 
moral situations in the kinds of responses they evoke" (161) . 
Rooney takes this shift to a more situational view of gender in moral rea-
soning as an impetus toward a more situational view of cognition, but she 
stresses that situated reasoning is not the same thing as contextual reasoning. 
"Care reasoning" may be contextual in a way that "justice reasoning" is sup-
posedly not, but both kinds of moral reasoning-indeed, all kinds of moral 
reasoning-are situated. If one set of moral reasoners is prone to use "rights 
and principles" talk, we need to ask what it is about the situation of these 
reasoners that constrains them to reason this way. Because gender is often a 
salient characteristic of social loca tion-one constructed and situated 
through particular norms and expectations-we may find that the gender of 
reasoners affects how they construct their "situatedness" and that, in specific 
social locations, men and women will construct their situatedness differently. 
Of particu lar importance for ethics is that recent psychological work has 
given an active ro le to moral situations, prompting Rooney to remark that 
"situations, thoughtfully encountered , can bring morality to people: it is not 
simply that people bring morality (in the form of some 'inner' capacities and 
virtues , consistent sets of moral principles, and so on) to situations" (164). If 
ethicists have failed to recognize the extent to which this is true, it may be 
because the hypothetical situations often described when presenting moral 
problems are, as Rooney stresses, preselected for the limited forms of moral 
rationality they employ. Indeed, the models of cognition that they employ 
only scarcely apply to moral problems as distinct from mathematical or log-
ical ones. Whether the moral situation is found in life or in li terature, humans 
employ more cognitive and affective capacities than those exhibited in the 
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artificial and hypothetical situations of ethical theory. Rooney asserts that 
these cognitive and affective capacities, "with moral practice and the devel-
opment of moral integrity, enhance rather than diminish the range of human 
reasoning capacities" (164) . Her recommendation is that feminist theorists 
operate with a more sophisticated picture of moral reasoning. 
James Lindemann Nelson provides a complex p icture of moral reasoning 
in his "Constructing Feelings: Jane Austen and Naomi Sche man on the Moral 
Role of Emotions." Nelson analyzes the views of moral reasoning presented 
by certain characte rs in Jane Austen's Sense and Sensibility and uses this 
analysis to critique Naomi Schema n's account of the role of emotions in 
moral cognition. 19 According to Nelson, Austen is concerned not merely with 
how character is developed in the Dashwood daughters but also w ith the 
"set of socially created and renewed resources" that contribute to the con-
struction of feelings, the direction of action, and the intelligibility of the 
world. Indeed, that Austen captures the effects that emotions have on moral 
reasoning with such clarity and elegance is what prompts Nelson to see her 
novel as a kind of exercise in moral cognition. Nelson suggests that we might 
view Austen herself as refuting the view, expressed by the character of Mar-
ianne, that "feelings as such reliably indicate where propriety lies." Nelson's 
own view of the emotions' contributions to mora l epistemology is more pos-
itive than Austen's, whose position in Sense and Sensibility appears also to 
be at odds with much recent feminist theory devoted to the positive role that 
emotions play in moral reasoning. 
Nelson's take is also at odds with Naomi Scheman's views on the role of 
emotion in moral reasoning. Scheman holds that one of the primaly func-
tions of emotions is to provide for the possibility of moral objectivity; emo-
tions are socia ll y constructed and essential to moral ju Igment. Nelson reads 
Scheman as saying that, as a social construction, an emotion is not a sta te of 
an individual and does not have the kind of causal relations that provide for 
its existence as an entity independent of a social context. In Scheman's view, 
one could not experience an emotion outside of a social context that relates 
feelings, sensations, thoughts, and behavior in ways that provide for a co-
herent explanation; or, as Nelson observes, "Scheman's view ... entails that 
emotions are not identifiable in terms of their causal effectiveness outside of 
particular fo rms of social practices and explanations" (169). 
For Nelson, the ontological status of emotions-whether they exist as 
functions of explanatOlY schemes o r whether they can be individuated apart 
from their role in social explanations-has important consequences for 
moral reasoning. He finds Scheman's account unclear regarding th conative 
or representational force of emotions-a force that he thinks is especially im-
portant when an emotion is discordant with some of our beliefs. For Nelson, 
emotions can and often do reveal what is morally salient in a situation; in 
support of this claim he cites Richmond Campbell 's analysis of fear as a rep-
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resentation that one is in imminent danger and Alison Jaggar's account of the 
importance of "outlaw emotions."2o The problem Nelson finds with Sche-
man's account of the moral role of emotions is that if emotions are functions 
of social explanations, the best that outlaw emotions can do is identify alter-
native strategies to the dominant stra tegy under which these emotions are 
deemed "outside of the law." Yet Scheman sees confrontations between ex-
planatory strategies as contributing to the search for moral objectivity; to at-
tain it requi res a set of stable and sharable beliefs to emerge from challenges 
by the widest possible set of alternatives. Nelson does not see how emotions, 
as Scheman chamctenzes them, can contribute to the resolu tion of these 
contests. If emotions only exist w ithin social explanations, can confli cting 
emotions indicate anything other than the existence of multiple explanatory 
strategies? Can they indicate that one strategy is more morally defensible 
than another? Nelson thinks that emotions can represent the world as being 
a certa in way because they do have causal powers that individuate them in-
dependently of an explanatolY scheme. Citing Scheman's discussion of the 
disagreement between the mother and son in Torch Song Trilogy as to 
whether the on's feelings of loss over his deceased homosexual lover are 
analogous to the mother'S feelings of loss fo r her deceased husband, Nelson 
observes that there is nothing inferential or interpretative about the son's suf-
fering. The son does not have to determine whether his emotion is located 
in an explanatolY scheme, and it is difficulL to believe that his mother would 
not recognize it as suffering-whether or not it qualified on her scheme as 
conjugal grief. Or, as Nelson observes about anger, "social p ractices might af-
fect anger in many ways-trigger it, shape it, control what counts as accept-
able expression of it, associate it and the forms of its expression in different 
ways according to gender or class-but not by providing it with the condi-
tions that are essential to its having its identity at all" (179) . He notes, in a 
similar vein , that although in Sense and Sensibility Marianne and her sister, 
Elinor, have different views of the explanatory scheme that holds that "feel-
ings as such reliably indicate where propriety lies," Elinor does not deny that 
Marianne feels what she feels. Marianne's defense of her emotions and of 
tlleir role in 'her view of propriety suggests tllat Marianne's emotions, pace 
Austen, may not have been so unreliable after all. Indeed, one might argue 
that these "outlaw emotions" represented the moral indefensibility of an ex-
planatOlY scheme that causes women to fee l so much shame over having 
done so little harm. 
In the concluding section of this volume contributors discuss how the in-
sights of feminist ethics can be applied in specific social contexts. Joan C. 
Tronto, whose Moml Bounda1·ies: A Political Argumentfor an Ethic of Care 
has influenced many contemporary theorists-including contributors to this 
volume-urges those working in profeSSional ethics to follow feminists in 
their examination of the mea nings ass igned to moral principles in reflexive 
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moral practices. In "Does Managing Professionals Affect Professional Ethics? 
Competence, Autonomy, and Care," she examines the claim-frequently 
criticized by those whose job it is to manage professionals-that formulating 
and monitoring ethical standards for the professions is properly left to their 
practitioners. Professionals defend their right to devise their own standards 
by appealing to notions of professional autonomy and professional compe-
tence. More than one feminist theorist has pointed out the ways in which 
professionals tend to cast them elves as autonomous (masculine) fi gures 
who are nearly heroic, who have to struggle to maintain their au tonomy 
against controlling (feminine) managers who resort to manipulation and in-
direction. Tronto believes that the notion of managing professionals is ethi-
cally dubious, and she thinks that the best way for professionals to make this 
case is to extend their idea of competence beyond knowing and applying 
technical expertise to include "caring well. " "Caring well" should not be 
equated with providing a "reasonable standard of care," w hich is usually un-
derstood to be a matter of conforming to a set of technical requireme nts, for 
caring well involves focusing not merely on the requirements of the moment 
but on the entire caring process. Accordingly, the competent professional-
the caregiver- must be not only technically competent but also attentive, re-
sponsible, and responsive . This will entail , among other things, using "mul-
tiple perspectives to make certain that care is not being distorted by relations 
of power and imposed or ignored needs" (192). 
But professional autonomy, and not just professional competence, needs 
to be reconceptualized if one is to find a solution to the problem of regulat-
ing professionals other than introducing nonprofessional managers. Tronto 
suggests that traditional views of professional autonomy tend to see p rofes-
sional practice as consisting of a relationship of only two parties : profes-
sional and client (patient) . But this picture neglects the extent to which pro-
fessional activities as they are currently carried out involve contributions 
from a number of other professionals . Tronto notes empirical studies sug-
gesting that the greater the extent that professionals see tl1emselves as a team 
and to the extent that they are willing to see each others as equals and to ac-
knowledge their vulnerabilities to other members of the team, the less likely 
they will be to find tl1eir work stressful and the more likely the team w ill be 
effective. Professionals who see themselves as separated from others with 
whom they work-and from their clients-because of differentials of power, 
distance, and professional hierarchies are less likely to communicate and ac-
knowledge the possibility of error. Tronto suggests that professional compe-
tence should be understood as a quality exhibited not so much by individu-
als as by teams or groups of profeSSionals. Professional au tonomy may then 
be seen as requiring profeSS ionals to take responsibility fo r the organizations 
of their professions, including the ir relationships with other professionals. In 
so doing, all professionals need to see themselves as similar to those of us in 
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society who also give care and notas markedly different from others because 
of their professional competence. They need to see professional ethics as not 
so different from the ethical responsibilities of people in society generally. 
The self-definition of many professionals emphasizes having expert 
knowledge-and a "calling"-that differentiates them from others. Thus do 
they claim to be self-regu lating, wrapping themselves, as Tronto says, in their 
"cloak of competence" and denying that nonprofessional managers are qual-
ified to challenge their professional judgment. Tronto suggests that profes-
sionals are, perhaps, even more concerned than others to assert their auton-
omy and demand the kind of self-control denied others for fear that their 
professions will be seen as like the more "feminine" caring professions. 
Given the extent to which contemporalY society seems committed to "flat hi-
erarchies," professionals may worry that their work is being devalued, and 
they may feel the need to reassert its value. But defending the value of one's 
own profession by devaluing the work of others seems unlikely to be a suc-
cessful strategy in the long run. As a result, Tronto proposes that the profes-
sions give up their claim to a special status based on their posseSSion of ex-
pelt knowledge that differentiates them from others. She urges, instead, that 
they acknowledge that they are able to care for others as a consequence of 
their competence and that caring well requires working with other profes-
sionals. Finally, she urges them to view caring well as central to the practice 
of all professions. They will then hold themselves and others with whom 
they work to the same standard as we would hold anyone else in society-
to a standard that includes the responsibility to care for others. 
Natalie Brender is also concerned with care as an ethical concept in the 
public sphere. Brender begins by recounting historical antecedents in which 
ethical theorists, usually men, have expressed anxiety about the shortcomings 
of those, usually women, who allow emotions or emotional dispositions such 
as care to dictate actions and policies in the public realm. Still , care can be a 
problematic concept in the political sphere, as Brender notes in her discus-
sion of humanitarian relief. Suffering is prolonged rather than reduced if and 
when humanitarian relief permits political power to remain with those who 
are responsible for initiating and perpetuating the conditions causing the suf-
fering. Brender argues that we must cultivate a degree of analytica l detach-
ment when responding to graphic representations of the suffering of those 
suffiCiently distant from us that we are unceltain of the suffering's causes and 
the consequences of our financia l help. Brender cites Margaret Walker's work 
on representational practices and mora l recognition to argue that the "moral 
graphics" of many calls for humanitarian relief seem designed to block recog-
nition by the audience that the suffering being represented is occurring in a 
specific sociopolitical and economic context. 21 Brender takes Walker's impli-
cations to be that "such a failure of recognition is not consequentially but in-
trinsically ethically deficient" (209) and that "notwithstanding the images' 
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success in producing a salutalY emotional and practical response, it is 
grounds for ethical criticism of the images that they foster a cognitive failure 
of recognition" (209) . Brender wants to insist, however, tha t analytical de-
tachment of the kind required to respond ethically to these images is not in-
compatible with care . Drawing on the work of Joan Tronto, Brender suggests 
problematic aspects of Western audience members responding to linages of, 
say, starving children-and "showing that they care"-by writing checks to 
relief agencies. Care, as Tronto has pointed out, differs in terms of its ob-
ject(s): one can care about someone in the sense of being generally con-
cerned for her well-being and can care jorsomeone, which requires attention 
to another's needs-physical, emotional, spiritual, intellectual, and psychic. 22 
Both of these can be done well or poorly, and to care well one must have 
knowledge about the needs, priorities, and demands of the specific situation 
and choose the appropriate course of action using the correct means. Writing 
a check to a relief agency is not an instance of caring j or those who are suf-
fering. Rather, it indicates that one cares about their suffering, although not 
enough to investigate the cause(s) of their suffering. It is true that the hu-
manitarian response may be inhibited if emotional appeals are accompanied 
by political analysis, but Brender notes that there is also a danger that those 
confronted with repeated images will cease to respond altogether. What 
makes both compassion and analytic detachment pOSSible-and not inher-
ently incompatible-is the cognitive content as well as the corrigibility of 
emotions. Representations that fail to acknowledge these aspects of our emo-
tionallives will, in the final analysis, be shOlt-lived and limited in their effec-
tiveness to provoke responses-humanitarian or othelw ise. 
Alison Bailey is also concerned with how feminism can inform analyses of 
political and social problems-but in a different context. She is concerned 
with how we conceive of our responsibility for hate crimes in the communi-
ties of which we are members. She cites the crimes committed against Brid-
get Ward, an African American single head of household, after moving to 
Bridesburg, a suburban area sometimes characterized as one of "Philadel-
phia's best kept secrets." Ward and her family moved out of their house in 
Bridesburg in less than two months because of repeated threats and acts of 
violence against them. Some residents of Bridesburg decried the hate cam-
paign against the Ward family and insisted that they were not racists, that this 
campaign was the work of a "few bad apples," and that the community as a 
whole did not want to be blamed for the acts of violence. In a traditional 
view of collective responsibility-what Bailey refers to as the liberal re-
sponse-a group is assigned responsibility for harms perpetrated by some of 
its members and it is the group's responsibility to hold the individual perpe-
trators accountable for their (past) actions. The focus, as Bailey notes, is "on 
the relationships between individuals in groups and the causal contribution 
each makes to a particular state of affairs," (221) and the perspective taken 
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on this state of affairs is primarily down and backward, that is, those who 
neither contributed to nor were the victims of the harmful act assign respon-
sibility to other members of their group for what these members have al-
ready done. In this view, the residents of Bridesburg are discharging what-
ever responsibility they have in condemning the members of their 
community who performed the acts. Bailey, echoing concerns of other fem-
inists, argues that the liberal account of collective responsibility is inadequate 
in the case of hate crimes. It fails to acknowledge that the identity of the vic-
tim is not incidental to the crime; rather, this individual was chosen to be the 
victim of the crime because he or she was a member of a targeted group. As 
a result, this conception of collective responsibility fails to recognize the so-
cial and systemic dimensions of the particular act of violence and thus con-
ceives of responsibility too narrowly. "To fully address the harms resulting 
from practices such as rape, gay bashing, and racially motivated violence," 
Bailey says, "our notion of responsibility must look beyond the moral mo-
ment of the crime itself" (222). Such crimes are a consequence not only of 
isolated intentions and actions of individuals but also of a social system of 
oppression, and thus we must consider the roles that communities play in 
keeping in place systems that increase the likelihood of such intentions and 
actions. 
As part of her analys is, Bailey cites Larry May's work on collective re-
sponsibility. May recognizes that the attitudes of a community toward mi-
nority groups may increase the odds that hate crimes will occur in a com-
munity .23 In May's account of shared responsibility, then, members of a 
community are held responsible for their attitudes and should look not only 
"down and backwa rd" but also forward to changing the shared attitudes that 
foster a tolerance of hate crimes in the community. Still , Ba iley worries that 
this attempt to share responsibility focLlses only on the attitudes, feelings, 
and behavior of the majo rity members of the community and not on the mi-
nority members who have been the victims of the hate crimes. Bailey won-
ders how successful this endeavor to change the majority'S attitude toward 
the population 's minority members can be if the latter'S views and experi-
ences are not taken into consideration. Indeed, she speculates that the moti-
vation for preventing any further hate crimes from occurring in this commu-
nity may well be the result of shame rather than genuine concern for the 
well-being of others. The problem, as Claudia Card has observed, is that 
what we see when we look up and fOlward will vaJY with our social loca-
tion24 If one is "a t home" in one's communi ty, one may have a great deal of 
difficulty not only in understanding why others feel ill at ease but also in 
knowing what causes them to have such feelings. Invoking Maria Lugones's 
notion of "world traveling,"25 Bailey suggests that we view oppressed mem-
bers of a society as those who have to world travel out of necess ity in the 
hope of escaping their oppression. In so doing, they are forced to travel to 
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places where they are not "at home" and where even well-meaning others 
may see them as outsiders. Those who inhabit positions of privilege travel to 
other worlds when, if, and how they choose and are at least predisposed to 
feel at ease wherever they are. As long as the "outside rs" remain the subject 
of conversation rather than a party to it, those who are privileged are un-
likely to have any idea of whether and how their actions-even well-
intentioned ones-contribute to the "outsider" being ill at ease. In place of 
May's notion of shared responsibility, Bailey thus proposes a more open-
ended account of responsibility in which we see ourselves as "acting with" 
rather than "acting for" the victims of hate crimes. In this account of respon-
sibility, we need to ask how a community should respond to prevent future 
harmful acts as we ll as past ones. In so doing, we need to include in our dis-
cussions of responsibility those who have been-and may be-harmed by 
hate crimes. Bailey closes by citing the example of Billings, Montana, a com-
munity that mobilized itself in the face of a series of hate crimes against 
African Americans, Jews, and Native Americans. In this case, various organi-
zations and community members, prompted by the suggestions and support 
of community leaders, demonstrated the ir opposition to those who had com-
mitted these hate crimes, their SUppOl1 of the victims of the crimes, and their 
intention of preventing any such crimes in the future. They engaged in such 
activities as attending services w ith the victims at their (defaced) church , dis-
p laying menorahs in their windows, and repairing the damaged homes of 
the victims. Such acts of solidarity exhibit the kind of collective responsibil-
ity that empowers moral communities and their members. 
Empowering moral communities and their members must be a goal of eth-
ical theory as long as moral authority and moral responsibility are necessary 
for us to survive and flourish. Achieving this end requires an analysis of how 
power is implicated in the moral structure of our social practices. In other 
words, we must do what feminists who do ethics-especially those in this 
volume-have done: see power in morality and morality in power. This is, 
we think, no small achievement. 
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ume. 
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